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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
The political changes caused by the democratic revolutions of Eastern
Europe and the thawing of Russian-American relations as indicated by the nuclear
and conventional arms treaties has resulted in the draw down of the military force
structure of the United States. Recent events in the Persian Gulf have barely
slowed the discharge of manpower and the retirement of major weapon systems.
In May 1990 OP-02 was tasked to submit a plan to reduce the manpower
level of naval aviation. Based on historical data from the 1960's it was determined
that a one-third savings in manpower could be accomplished if Fleet Replacement
Squadrons (FRS) that were currently operating on each coast were consolidated
into a single unit in order to conduct single site training. Based on the initial
projections by OP-02 training for the A-6E Intruder, S-3A/B Viking, and the E-2C
Hawkeye & C-2A Greyhound FRSs were consolidated in the POM '92 budget
without further consideration.
Reaction by each community was swift and well organized to point out the
weaknesses of such a plan. The communities organized and presented their case
through the chain of command up to the Commanders Naval Air Forces Atlantic
(AirLant) and Pacific (AirPac) respectively. A joint AirLant/AirPac message to the
Chief of Naval Operations advocated for a continuation of dual site FRSs.
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Billets that had been canceled in fiscal year 1992 have been reinstated.
However, implementation of the consolidation plan has not been rescinded, only
delayed.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of this research project is to analyze costs/savings that would
possibly result if the East coast Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW 1 ) Fleet
Replacement Squadron (FRS) is disbanded and the mission associated with this
unit is transferred to the West coast FRS, resulting in a single site training in the
E-2C Hawkeye and the C-2A Greyhound aircraft.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What impact would consolidation of the two coast E-2C and C-2A FRS
training pipeline into a single squadron have on replacement aircrew training
and fleet squadron operations?
2. What expenses would be incurred if the status quo student throughput and
flight simulator utilization were maintained?
3. What alternatives and related expenses are viable in view of limited funding
dollars and manpower reductions?
4. What costs are associated with each alternative in implementing the FRS
consolidation?
1 The naval aviation abbreviation for a Carrier Airborne Early
Warning Squadron is VAW.
D. SCOPE OF LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this research is to examine if relevant cost items were
considered and properly evaluated during the VAW study to keep the current dual
FRS system. The objective is not to dispute the premise that a one-third
manpower savings could be achieved through consolidation of the FRSs, but
rather to explore those relevant costs that could result if such a proposal is
implemented.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in this research consisted of the following
components: (1) Examination of pertinent message traffic, point papers, discussion
papers, and studies related to the consolidation proposal, (2) Interview selected
individuals directly involved with the consolidation issue, (3) Independent evaluation
of cost versus savings data over the short run life of the consolidation.
Conclusions will be based on the break-even period without inflation or the
time value of money applied. In addition to the monetary factors discussed, non-
monetary issues related to the proposed consolidation will be summarized.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction
of the thesis. Chapter II provides background information regarding both the E-2C
and C-2A aircraft mission and the current FRS system. Chapter III presents areas
where cost savings and added expenses that are probable in maintaining the
status quo of aircrew training and fleet readiness. Chapter IV presents an analysis
of viable alternatives and the related expenses and saving that would occur if
adopted. In addition, where possible the impact on FRS training is included with
the alternative cost figures. Chapter V presents the researcher's conclusions and
recommendations.
II. AIRCRAFT AND MISSION
Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) have a primary mission to train pilots,
naval flight officers (NFO), and enlisted technicians on a specific type of naval
aircraft. All naval aircraft (F-14, A-6, S-3, P-3, etc.) have a training squadron on
each coast to train personnel in the flying and maintenance of a particular aircraft.
The only major exception is the EA-6B community, because of its small size, is
single sited at Whidby Island, Washington, with the West coast A-6 squadrons.
The subject of this study, the E-2C Hawkeye and C-2A Greyhound FRSs, are
Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron One Hundred Twenty (VAW-120) at
Naval Air Station (NAS) Norfolk in Norfolk, Virginia and One Hundred Ten
(VAW-110) at NAS Miramar in San Diego, California.
A. THE E-2C HAWKEYE
The E-2C Hawkeye is the Navy's premier command and control aircraft.
Through use of a long range air and surface search radar, on-board computer
processing, and radio data-links it can detect, track and relay locating information
to surface ships, as well as fighter and attack aircraft. Two pilots and three NFOs
make up a normal mission crew.
Responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests solely with the plane's aircraft
commander, who is always a pilot. One NFO will hold the designation of mission
commander. The mission commander is responsible for the tactical employment
of the aircraft. Close coordination between the plane commander and the mission
commander is critical in achieving mission success.
B. THE C-2A GREYHOUND
The C-2A Greyhound is the Navy's primary fixed wing supply aircraft that can
support an aircraft carrier operating beyond the range of helicopters. The aircraft
has a minimum crew of four; pilot, co-pilot, load master, and plane captain. The
C-2A transports passengers and cargo between land and the underway aircraft
carrier.
C. FLEET REPLACEMENT AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
Both VAW-110 and VAW-120 train enlisted technicians for the E-2C and the
C-2A at a Fleet Replacement Aviation Maintenance Program (FRAMP). Initially
both sites taught plane captain and load master courses, but did not duplicate
training in the more specialized areas of both aircraft. VAW-1 10 taught jet engine
maintenance, system hydraulics, and airframe maintenance for both coasts.
VAW-120 on the other hand taught avionics technicians who support the radar,
computer and radios; and aviation electricians who maintain the wiring system of
the aircraft.
Beginning in 1989 both FRAMPs began duplicating the courses of instruction.
Full duplication will be complete in 1992. Course duplication was initiated when
significant cost savings was possible when the cost of an instructor and training
equipment was compared to the cost of moving permanent change of station
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(PCS) students training en route to their ultimate command, or temporary
additional duty (TAD) students cost of training away from their parent command.
VAW-120 in calendar year 1990, operating with 25 instructors, trained 169 PCS and
202 TAD students. With the exception of personnel with orders to one of the two
overseas C-2 squadrons, per diem and travel costs for each student was not
incurred. In addition, squadrons traditionally could neither afford the cost nor the
loss of manpower that resulted whenever a student was sent to the other coast for
training. Therefore, training for current squadron personnel was rarely provided.
Training remained limited to those courses were available locally at no cost. The
dual site training has allowed more enlisted personnel to receive specific technical
training for their type aircraft. The end result can be found in better aircraft
availability and increased enlisted morale in not having to use on-the-job training
that was prevalent for some ratings in years past.
Because of the specialized work required, close coordination between the
FRAMPs and Naval Manpower Personnel Command (NMPC) is required to meet
future fleet squadron manning requirements. Students receive training in order to
replace specific personnel who are preparing to complete their sea duty
obligations.
D. COLLATERAL ASSIGNMENTS
Besides its duties as an FRS, VAW-120 serves as the model manager for the
E-2C and C-2A aircraft, and VAW-110 serves as the model manager for the two
newest versions of the E-2C. Both squadrons manage the Naval Aviation Training
Operations Procedures Standardized (NATOPS), tactics manual, and training
syllabus for both aircraft.
E. STUDENT CLASSIFICATIONS
The training syllabus that a student undergoes is dependent on the level of
experience he arrives with. Pilot and NFO students are divided into three
categories; Cat I, Cat II, and Cat III. A Cat I student arrives with no experience in
either the E-2C or C-2A. Cat I students have the longest training syllabus because
everything presented will be new to them. Cat II students are officers returning for
refresher training prior to reporting back to a fleet squadron. Cat II students
undergo an abbreviated syllabus since they are there to reacquaint themselves
with the aircraft and learn what changes may have occurred since they last flew.
Category III students are the most experienced. They have had several tours in
either the E-2C or C-2A. Cat III students normally are senior officers en route to
becoming the executive officer (XO) of a squadron. Category III students require
the least amount of training normally because of their high level of experience.
Table I shows the prescribed time a student is expected to be in training.
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The E-2C and the C-2A are dissimilar in mission, have few common parts; but
have similar flight controls and flight characteristics. E-2C and C-2A pilots can
transition between either aircraft after minimal training. In addition, the C-2A
aircraft is not a warfare specialty, meaning that a pilot cannot expect to be
promoted beyond the junior pay grades if he stays in C-2s his entire career. At
sometime he must serve a tour as an E-2 pilot to receive a warfare designation.
Therefore, VAW-1 10 and VAW-120 are tasked to train pilots in two different aircraft.
The pilot training syllabus is balanced between class work, simulators, and
actual flying. Following initial carrier qualifications and dual engine training at
intermediate training squadrons in Texas and Florida, a student pilot arrives at the
FRS with no exposure to the E-2C or the C-2A aircraft. Students initially receive
classroom lectures on the systems of the aircraft. Systems such as engines, fuel,
hydraulics and electrical are taught in exacting detail. The students also
immediately begin training on cockpit familiarization and become proficient in
normal and emergency procedures using a static cockpit mockup.
Since the E-2C is a dual piloted - dual controlled aircraft, student pilots serve
as co-pilots on NFO training hops. This gives the students a better understanding
of the aircraft's mission and his role in it.
1 . The 2F1 1 Flight Simulator
After completing the classroom phase of his training, student pilots enter
training on the 2F1 10 simulator. The 2F1 10 is a full motion - fully functional cockpit
that operates in either a night land or a night carrier environment. The trainer
operates normally with one instructor as operator/evaluator.
Training emphasis is on normal cockpit procedures such as engine
start, take-off and landing; but more importantly - emergency procedures are
practiced relentlessly. Very difficult and judgement critical decisions are forced
from students who must contend with multiple emergencies, fly the aircraft and
communicate with the crew and air traffic controllers.
It is impossible to determine how many aircraft and crew have been
saved because pilots were allowed to face simulated life threatening situations and
were able to practice hands on both the procedures and flying skills required to
extricate their aircraft from an extremis situation.
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2. The 2C20B Simulator
For the C-2A a hybrid between the static E-2C Cockpit Procedures
Trainer (CPT) and the 2F1 10 full motion trainer has been developed. The 2C20B
is an interactive training device that gives having many of the capabilities of the
2F110, with the exception of full motion. To simulate motion the 2C20B uses a
projection system to give the visual cues of flying. But unlike the CPT, the
2C20B's gages and controls operate like the real aircrafts would.
3. Flight Training
The formal flight training syllabus requires hands on demonstration of
skills learned in the 2F1 10. Standard operating procedures are reenforced, but the
emphasis of the flight phase is to build up experience in the flight characteristics
of the E-2C or the C-2A. Both aircraft are powered by two T-56 Allison turboprop
engines with fiberglass Hamilton Standard propellers. Both engines turn
clockwise, thus inducing a significant movement about the aircraft's flight axes.
When power is applied the aircraft nose pitches up, and the wings roll right due
to the torque of the engines. When power is removed from the aircraft the
opposite effect is induced, the plane's nose drops and the wings roll left. It
therefore becomes necessary for student pilots to develop a sense of how much
stick and rudder needs to be applied in order to preempt the forces of the engines.
Such skills are mandatory when the student pilot progresses from normal airfield
landings to field carrier landing practices (FCLP) in preparation for actual carrier
landings.
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FCLPs are conducted on dry land at a specially configured airstrip that
has been painted to represent the landing area of a carrier, and has the visual
lighting cues to replicate what a student would see when approaching a carrier for
landing. FCLPs build the student's confidence in following the procedures dictated
in the carrier's landing pattern. The only short-coming of FCLPs are that they
cannot simulate the effect of trying to land on a moving surface, and then being
shot into the air by a steam catapult. Students must draw on their experiences
learned from the 2F110 carrier simulator routine to prepare for those events.
Pilots returning to flight duty or transitioning between the E-2C and C-2A
go through an abbreviated syllabus that allows experienced pilots to brush up on
their system knowledge and regain their flying skills.
As a result of the loss of one of their E-2C to a mishap, the U.S. Coast
Guard will have their pilots go through a 10-12 week training syllabus. This is
expected to include both simulator and actual training flights.
G. NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING
Student Naval Flight Officers (SNFO) arrive from Pensacola, Florida, following
successful completion of basic and intermediate training where they learned
instrument navigation, basic fighter maneuvers and how to fly low altitude bombing
missions. None of these areas directly relate to their job as an E-2C NFO, but
develops empathy for the aircraft that they will eventually control.
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SNFOs go through a lengthy classroom training on each portion of the E-2Cs
weapon system. Radar, IFF, navigation, passive detection system (PDS), and
communication equipment are taught in detail to allow students to understand how
they work, alternative modes of operation, and troubleshooting possible to regain
operation if a malfunction occurs during flight. Following successful completion of
a course of instruction, each student flies a mission to demonstrate his practical
knowledge in operating and trouble shooting the equipment.
1. The 15F8 Trainer
The 15F8 serves as the NFO mission trainer. It does not simulate
aircraft motion, but it can replicate operations in areas of the world that E-2s might
be expected to be employed. The trainer requires a maximum of four operators
to run the mission scenario, and an instructor to evaluate each of the three
SNFOs. Therefore, a maximum staff of seven is required to train three SNFOs.
The 15F8's computers generate landmass depicting the geographic area of
operation, shipping, air traffic, missiles, radio jamming, and radar transmissions
associated with the ships, aircraft, or land-based defenses. The four 15F8
operators orchestrate the scenario by controlling the air and surface contacts,
mimic radio traffic normally encountered on the eight radios in the aircraft, and
respond to student commands to ships and aircraft that are under their control.
The student instructors control the pace of the trainer. Through inquiries,
recommendations, and when warranted - pausing the simulation for counseling;
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students learn the thought processes and tactics necessary to control
engagements and report tactical information to the afloat commander.
The 15F8 can closely replicate the real world that E-2s operate in when
deployed with a carrier battle group. Students must become proficient in
conducting air-to-air intercepts, war-at-sea strikes, overland strikes, and E-2
controlled recovery of aircraft on-board the aircraft carrier. Because the E-2's
mission supports, coordinates and controls many other units ranging from admiral
staffs to individual ships and aircraft, the 15F8 is critical in training SNFOs in the
proper conduct of their mission that cannot be found except in the real world
carrier battle group environment, where errors in judgement could have disastrous
consequences for those who rely on the E-2's information or control. Without the
15F8 mission trainer the cost to use real ships, aircraft, and staffs would be too
expensive to train SNFOs in command and control.
H. FLEET USE OF 2F110 AND 15F8
Fleet and reserve pilots use the 2F1 10 to maintain their flying skills, especially
now that flying dollars are limited. Fleet squadrons use the 2F110 to revive their
landing skills on the aircraft carrier in preparation for returning to shipboard
operations.
Fleet NFOs also maintain their proficiency by using the 15F8, but in addition
have practiced and evaluated new tactics before actual employment by the battle
group. In addition, fleet squadrons go through Fleet Air Superiority Training
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(FAST) prior to commencing their deployment work-up schedule. FAST is taught
by the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TopGun), and uses classroom instruction
supported by intense simulator battle problems.
VAW-110's simulators are also used by Carrier Airborne Early Warning
Weapon School (CAEWWS), to train E-2C pilots and NFOs how to better employ
their aircraft in support of advanced airwing tactics.
Both student and experienced pilots and NFOs fully use their specific trainers
to improve their skills, develop and evaluate new tactics without adding to the
demand for limited flight time.
I. VERSIONS OF THE E-2C HAWKEYE AND THE C-2A GREYHOUND
Neither the E-2C Hawkeye nor the C-2A Greyhound aircraft are
homogeneous. Both have significant variations that directly impact the training
provided by both FRSs.
1. Operational Versions of the E-2 Hawkeye
The E-2 family of aircraft are the only aircraft designed from the start to
fulfill the requirement for airborne early warning. The exterior of the aircraft has
only been slightly modified since its inception, nearly all improvements have
occurred within the airframe itself. Each modification has improved and automated
detection, tracking, and reporting, thus freeing the three NFOs of routine functions
and allowing them to survey effectively an area of over a thousand cubic miles.
The E-2A was introduced into fleet service in 1964 with limited success. Beginning
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in 1969 the E-2As were modified into E-2Bs. The major modification was the
installation of an improved computer, the Litton L-304. Production of the E-2C was
initiated in 1971. The E-2C (Figure 1) was a significant improvement in operational
capability, with a major upgrading of the principal avionics, entering naval service
in 1973. Over the years the E-2C has continued to be modified and currently
operates in three distinct variants:
Figure 1. The Grumman E-2C Hawkeye.
a. The APS-138/ALR-73 Configuration
The baseline version of the E-2C is configured with the APS-138
radar and the ALR-73 Passive Detection System (PDS). All earlier versions of the
E-2C have been upgraded to this configuration. Structural fatigue has resulted in
expensive wing, tail, engine, and rotodome reenforcement. Starting in 1985
portions of the older APS-125 radar system was modified to give the radar
additional capability in a jamming environment. This new configuration was
designated the APS-138. In addition, the older PDS system (ALR-59) was
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significantly improved to automate many functions that had required one NFO to
monitor in order to effectively utilize the equipment. This equipment was
redesignated the ALR-73. The U.S. Navy has 67 copies of this version operating
throughout the fleet.
b. The APS-139/T56-A-427 Configuration
Over the years the operating environment of the E-2 had changed
from predominantly open ocean operations to serving as a sentinel off the coast
of world trouble spots. Starting in 1988 the E-2C radar was again modified to
improve overland detection and tracking. Significant modifications were made to
the interior arrangement of the equipment to fit new and future equipment.
From its inception the E-2 had increased significantly in weight. To
meet the navy's single engine emergency requirement the newest version of the
T-56 engine was accepted - the T56-A-427. The 427 engine, as it is known,
increases the thrust by approximately 30% giving the aircraft a greater rate of climb
and improved fuel efficiency. Unfortunately this also changed the landing
characteristics of the aircraft, thereby increasing the danger of crashing during
carrier landings. Carrier approach speeds are a factor of the speed of the aircraft
and its weight. The carrier's arresting gear has an upper limit on the amount of
inertia (weight times speed) that they can withstand. The E-2C is now the heaviest
aircraft capable of landing on the carrier. Unfortunately the aircraft must approach
the ship within a narrow safety margin between the maximum engagement speed
and the minimum airspeed needed to sustain flight. Because of the added weight
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and higher thrust of the 427 engine, pilots must attempt landings at minimum
power setting. This slow approach speed makes the aircraft react sluggishly when
corrections are initiated in trying to land aboard ship. For this reason, pilots will
need to have even greater flying abilities than before if accidents are to be avoided.
Production of this variant is expected to be limited to 18 airframes.
c. The APS-145/JTIDS Configuration
Starting in 1990 what is expected to be the final variant of the E-2C
began production. Building on the APS-139 radar the APS-145 radar began
operations. Major changes include an even greater detection range and additional
anti-jam features. Because of the increased number of tracks possible to display
on the NFO scopes, color symbology is being introduced to allow the operators
to distinguish more easily friend, hostile, and unknown. Provision was made to
receive the navy's newest tactical data link - the Joint Tactical Integrated Data
System (JTIDS). JTIDS is a spread spectrum high speed data link designed to
improve the navy's command and control structure in a heavy jamming
environment. Currently 27 copies of this variant are expected to be produced.
The APS-139 variant is scheduled to be updated to the APS-145/JTIDS
configuration beginning in 1993. In addition, 36 of the APS-138 variant are
expected to undergo major modifications to function as APS-145/JTIDS variants.
Some time after the turn of the century the navy will operate with a complete E-2C
force of 81 APS-145/JTIDS aircraft. The remaining APS-138 aircraft should have
met their useful life and been retired.
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2. Operational Versions of the C-2 Greyhound
The rapid delivery of high-priority personnel, urgently needed stores and
mail to the U.S. carrier fleet at sea was obviously one that could be carried out
effectively by aircraft. Thus, carrier on-board delivery (COD) aircraft have for many
years been an essential component to U.S. naval aviation.
a. The Initial C-2A
The E-2 with its capacity to lift heavy equipment from the flight deck
and fly for up to six hours led the Navy to take a logical step in developing a
carrier on-board delivery (COD) version. Using an entirely different fuselage and
tail, the C-2 (Figure 2) was introduced into fleet service in 1964. Only 25 of the
C-2A aircraft were build, and operated exclusively from squadrons based in Sicily
and the Philippines. It has become common for single plane detachments to
embark the carriers when they passed these bases and operate with the carriers
while in their forward deployed position. This gives aircraft carriers a heavy lift
capacity between ship and shore. While embarked the C-2s are hosted by the E-2
squadron on-board. Since most of the C-2's systems are similar to the E-2's, this
reduces the manpower requirements for embarking the C-2s.
b. The Reprocured C-2A
In 1988 the navy retired the last of the venerable C-1 Traders. The
C-1s had also operated from the same bases as the C-2, and provided short lift
capacity for operations near the U.S. coast. The navy recognized that a
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Figure 2. The Grumman C-2A Greyhound.
replacement was needed for the C-1s, it was decided to reopen the successful C-2
line in 1987. This new-production C-2 retained the C-2A designation, but
underwent some modifications to its aircraft systems. To differentiate between the
two models, the newer aircraft have become known as C-2A(R) to recognize that
operating procedures are different in the newer aircraft. The navy purchased 39
of the C-2A(R).
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III. THE FRS CONSOLIDATION PROPOSAL
There is no doubt that consolidation of the FRSs into a single unit would
reduce the manpower requirements in naval aviation. A reorganization would have
a cost savings from the reduction in operating target (OPTAR) funds, and salaries
by the dissolution of VAW-120. Of equal importance is the added expense likely
to be incurred by the navy, if the facilities at VAW-110 are tasked to assume the
additional burden of VAW-120's training requirement. What follows are
savings/cost categories directly relevant to the consolidation issue. All figures are
in 1990 constant dollars.
A. PROJECTED SAVINGS
The transfer of VAW-120's mission to VAW-110 is estimated to have the
following savings [Ref. 1]:





Military Construction (Milcon) fund provides for the installation and
facilities for the Department of the Navy by funding land purchases and
construction. Milcon has a five year period in which to be obligated, starting in the
fiscal year in which it was appropriated. Milcon contracts are closely scrutinized
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by Congress, making it uncertain how or if the funds could be assigned to a
different project.
Construction project P-128 is additional classroom and teaching aid
facilities that would allow VAW-120 FRAMP to teach all the courses necessary to
support the training of enlisted technicians for E-2C squadrons and C-2A units
both on the East coast and in the Mediterranean. Construction was held in
abeyance for 90 days while the outcome of the consolidation was being staffed.
Construction has commenced and is scheduled for completion in fiscal year
1992.[Ref. 2]
2. OPTAR
The closure of VAW-120 would free up its associated operating funds.
OPTAR originates from the Operations and Maintenance, Navy account (0&M,N).
It has an obligation period limited to the fiscal year in which it was allocated. O&M
funds finance the cost of on-going operations (i.e., squadron operations, civilian
personnel salaries, flying hours, maintenance of real property, training, etc.).
3. Manpower
Single siting the E-2C and C-2A FRSs is expected to result in a billet
savings of 16 officers and 155 enlisted personnel [Ref. 1]. Funding for manpower
expenses come from the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) account. This account
funds the cost of active duty navy personnel (i.e., military pay, allowances, clothing,
subsistence, Gl Bill, PCS, retired pay accrual, etc.). The MPN account is controlled
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by NMPC and must be obligated within the fiscal year it is appropriated. NMPC
will reallocate these funds to where it has shortfalls or lose the funds entirely in the
annual budget procedure.
B. PROJECTED ADDITIONAL EXPENSES
If the FRS consolidation were to go through, VAW-110 would become the
sole source provider for all levels of training associated with the E-2C and C-2A
aircraft. This includes all US Navy, US Coast Guard, and all FMS training.
VAW-1 10, and VAW-120 for that matter, are functioning at their designed capacity.
The sudden influx of students and instructors would immediately require additional
funding in order to complete the prescribed training syllabus and graduate
students with the allotted time period. The following additional costs were included
in the analysis of the consolidation proposal:
1. Milcon
The additional training requirements that VAW-110 would have to meet
calls for an almost immediate increase in its training capacity. Needed are more
classroom and instructor facilities, buildings for additional simulators, ramp space
for more aircraft, and an increased burden on the already short supply of bachelor
officer and enlisted quarters. An estimate of $15.69 million would be needed for
VAW-110 to have the capacity to meet its pilot and NFO training requirements.
The following are estimates on portions of the Milcon requirements [Ref. 3]:
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Table II. MILCON REQUIREMENTS FOR SINGLE SITE FRS AT NAS
MIRAMAR.
Facility Area Cost
Offices/Classroom 16000 sq ft $ 480,000
15F8/2F110 Building 6100 sqft $1,100,000
FRAMP Trainer Building 40000 sq ft $1,200,000
Hangar/Ramp 25000 sq ft $5,200,000
BOQ 3800 sq ft $ 360,000
BEQ 24700 sq ft $2,200,000
High Pressure Air (Wells) $ 300,000
Fire Fighting Upgrade $4,300,000
Utility Upgrades $ 550.000
TOTAL $15,690,000
2. Simulators
The single siting of the FRSs does not remove the need for flight/mission
simulators (2F1 10 and 15F8) for the fleet squadrons. How best to handle the influx
of students at VAW-110 needs to be resolved.
Presented first is a review of the status quo utilization of the trainers,
then an estimation of the demand expected on the single site trainer
[Ref. 4].
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Table III. VAW-110 CURRENT SIMULATOR REQUIREMENTS
Student Type Hours Per Year
(Estimated Number/Yrt
E-2C Cat I Pilot (19)
E-2C Cat II Pilot (6)
C-2A Cat I Pilot (12)
C-2A Cat II Pilot (4)
E-2C Cat I NFO (28)


















Table IV. VAW-12 CURRENT SIMULATOR REQUIREMENTS
Student Type Hours Per Year
(Estimated Number/Yh
E-2C Cat I Pilot (21)
E-2C Cat II Pilot (7)
C-2A Cat I Pilot (21)
C-2A Cat II Pilot (7)








CPT - Cockpit Procedures Trainer. A static mockup of an E-2C cockpit.
2. There are five fleet and one reserve E-2C squadron at NAS Miramar,













3. CAEWWS - Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School is the E-2C
tactics school similar to the Navy Fighter Weapon School (TopGun).
4. Japan, Israel, Egypt, and Singapore have purchased the E-2C through
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Trainer facilities are provided when requested
by the State Department and approved by the Defense Department.
5. Total annual training hours for U.S. Coast Guard personnel is under
development.
Table V provides an estimate of the number of hours per device if
VAW-110 were to serve as the single training site for E-2C and C-2A pilots and
NFOs. Training device hours are projections based on the VAW-110 training
syllabus, which differs from the syllabus used at VAW-120.
Table V. VAW-110 PROJECTED SIMULATOR
Student Type Hours Per Year
(Estimated Number/Yr) 2F110 CPT 15F8
E-2C Cat 1 Pilot (46) 2838 1076 86
E-2CCat II Pilot (12) 552 216 24
C-2A Cat I Pilot (24) 1584 600 48
C-2ACatll Pilot (11) 276 110 22
E-2C Cat I NFO (65) 130 3828
E-2CCat II NFO (16) 32 1544
Fleet Squadrons 1250 1250
CAEWWS 30 300
Reserves 50 120
Foreign Military Sales 300 500
TOTAL 7042 2002 7722
Note: Tables III and IV are historical averages, table V is the projected near-term student
throughput. This is why tables III and IV do not add up to table V figures.
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In order to calculate the number and types of simulators required, the
maximum training time available for each device must be determined. This is done
by multiplying five work days a week times 52 weeks to get the number of work
days/year (260). Table VI presents an estimation of the number of training devices
required to meet the projected simulator requirements for single site training
(Table V) and the number of hours the trainers are available per day; 8, 10, 14, or
16 hours.
Table VI. SINGLE SITE SIMULATOR REQUIREMENTS.
Hours/Yr. Hours Available Per Year Number Trainers Required
Device (Table 4) 8 10 14 16
2F110 7042 2080 2600 3640 4160
CPT 2002 2080 2600 3640 4160
15F8 7722 2080 2600 3640 4160
8 10 14 16
3.39 2.71 1.93 1.69
.96 .77 .55 .48
3.71 2.97 2.12 1.87
Table VI shows that a single static Cockpit Procedures Trainer (CPT) is
able to meet the expected demand of an eight hour training day. Both the pilot's
2F110 and the NFO's 15F8 training requires a minimum of two trainers with a 14
hour day. Taken to the extreme of 24 hour utilization (260 days X 24 hours =
6,240 hours) neither current trainer can meet the availability requirement
(7042/6240 = 1.13 and 7722/6240 = 1.24) with a single trainer.
The single siting of the FRSs does not remove the requirement for East
coast trainer usage. Fleet and reserve squadrons as well as foreign military sales
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would keep both the 2F1 10 and 15F8 fully utilized. The E-2C static cockpit trainer
in Norfolk would no longer be needed. For $2.5 million it could be moved to
Miramar and modified into a C-2A static cockpit.
The conclusion that can be drawn from Table VI is that a second 15F8
and 2F110 trainer is required to meet the simulator requirements of the training
syllabus. A group II (APS-145/JTIDS) 15F8 trainer would cost $43.2 million, and
a group I (427 engine) 2F110 would cost $21 .5 million. Total cost for both trainers
and relocating and modifying the Norfolk CPT is $67.2 million [Ref. 3]. Facilities
for these three simulators is included in the Milcon discussion.
At VAW-120 both the 2F110 and the 15F8 use Contractor Supported
Instruction (CSI) contracts to operate the trainers. CSI personnel free up the staff
officers so that they can make more productive use of their time. Currently
VAW-110 has only 80% CSI support for the pilot trainer and 45% for the NFO
trainer. The cost to VAW-1 10 to operate both simulators 14-15 hours per weekday
with 100% CSI is $400,000 for the 2F1 10 and $1 million for the 15F8. In addition,
$45,000 would be needed for a civilian trainer manager to keep track of CSI and
trainer maintenance paper work. Therefore the annual recurring cost in civilian
support of the single site simulators is $1,445 million [Ref. 5].
3. FRAMP
The expense in relocating FRAMP includes both men and equipment.
Most of the FRAMP training aids can be easily transported across country with the
exception of the Integrated Systems Maintenance Trainer (ISMT). The ISMT is
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constructed with teflon coated wiring that would be destroyed in the move. The
cost to replace the wiring, parts and labor, is between $3 million and $3.5 million.
The cost to move the other 16 FRAMP trainers is $2 million. The cost of setting
up the new FRAMP is $972,000. [Ref. 6]
The cost to transfer 20 FRAMP instructors is $6,000 each, or $120,000
total. Annual recurring expenses for the replacement of four instructors (eight
moves) is $48,000. The travel and per diem cost for the estimated 390 East coast
students is $1,436 million. Total recurring expenses are expected to be $1,484
million.
4. Officer, Enlisted, and Student Expenses
Relocating the VAW-1 20 enlisted and officers to VAW-1 1 would give the
single site training squadron the wealth of knowledge and experience needed to
immediately train students and maintain the additional aircraft allocated to the
squadron. Forty-two officers and 100 enlisted would be relocated, costing $6,000
each, totaling $852,000.
Annual expense associated with officer relocation includes those both
staff and students. Fourteen staff officers are expected to be replaced by other
East coast officers annually. These 28 moves costing $6,000 each would total
$168,000 annually. Annual Category I student transfers are projected to be 68 for
E-2C pilots/NFOs and C-2A pilots. At a cost of $3,000 each, a total recurring
student transfer cost of $340,000 is expected. Category II and III officers would
normally complete training in less than four month and would not be eligible to
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move their households and families to Miramar. The estimated 34 Category ll/lll
students would be entitled to per diem for the duration of their training at VAW-1 10.
The daily per diem rate differs from a low of $45/day if rooms are provided at the
bachelor officer quarters (BOQ), to a high of $101 /day if rooms are not provided.
Therefore, Category ll/lll recurring student costs range from $185,000 (w/ BOQ)
to $412,000 (w/o BOQ). [Ref. 6]
5. Variable Housing Allowance
The government recognizes that the cost of living varies from location
to location across the country. The cost of living is higher in San Diego (Miramar)
than it is in Norfolk. Therefore, all PCS staff and students would be entitled to the
higher rate of housing allowance. This is estimated to result in an additional
$830,000 in annual expenses.
6. Other Expenses
Aircrew ordered to Group I and Group II squadrons cannot be trained
in the original E-2C and vice versa. The E-2C Group I and Group II aircraft with
their 427 engines have different handling characteristics and performance figures
than the original E-2C. In addition, the Group II aircraft contains a new radar
system, color displays, JTIDS, as well as numerous other improvements. The
configuration differences between the three E-2C variants are significant as
discussed in Chapter II. Based on the expected student load, FRAMP training
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requirements, and historical aircraft availability; Table VII shows the aircraft needed
to fulfill single site training requirements.
Table VII. PROJECTED FRS/FRAMP AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS.
Aircraft Type Allocated Onboard Required Needed
E-2C 8/1 5/0 12/1 7/1
E-2CGroupl 2/0 3/0 4/1 1/1
E-2C Group II 0/0 0/0 5/1 5/1
C-2A(R) 2J1 MQ. Ml 2/1
TOTALS 12/2 11/0 26/4 15/4
Note: Left numbers are FRS requirements, right numbers are FRAMP requirements.
The impact of more than doubling the number of aircraft on the VAW-1 10
flight line was partially addressed in the discussion on Milcon. The additional
aircraft will also require an increase in the support and test equipment on-hand at
the squadron. Just as important is the additional test benches and spare parts
available at the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD). Additional
personnel with the required expertise to operate the test equipment may be
available with transfers from VAW-1 20. The expense of additional spare parts, test
equipment, and AIMD test benches has not been quantified. What excess
equipment would result in the disbanding of VAW-1 20, or is needed to support
those squadrons remaining, has not been determined. What is determinable is the




In the following chapter, savings and expense items listed in this chapter will
be grouped and summed as either recurring or non-recurring. Next, the
summations will be used to determine the break even, or payback period, for the
proposed consolidation would occur. If this results in an unacceptable conclusion,
scenarios will be developed that limit expenses and increase savings in an attempt




The consolidation of the E-2C/C-2A fleet replacement squadrons (FRS) can
be evaluated from three aspects. The first is the primary goal to reduce the
manpower requirements in naval aviation. The second is the financial impact likely
to be incurred if single site training were ordered. The third is non-monetary issues
that the consolidation would also present.
The expectation of saving a third of the manpower used by VAW-120 is
accepted without challenge. The only competent authority to determine if this is
valid is the Naval Manpower Evaluation Command (NAVMEC). NAVMEC has not
been tasked to perform such an evaluation. Based on historical precedent, a one-
third reduction in manpower is not an unreasonable expectation.
The evaluation of the financial aspects of the consolidation are just as
important as the reduction in manpower it is expected to produce. Faced with
shrinking budgets, decisions made solely based on the measurement of manpower
requirements may have significant and disastrous impact on budget outlays far into
the future. The fiscal impact will be evaluated in several scenarios. First, an all
inclusive break-even evaluation of the expected expenses and savings will be
presented. Anticipating that this will result in an impossible situation, further
evaluations are presented; including a discussion of the possible impact of the
avoidance of large one-time and/or recurring expenses. All figures and scenarios
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are presented without consideration of other future decisions that may impact the
facilities at NAS Miramar or the E-2 and C-2 communities. For instance, relocation
of the fighter squadrons at NAS Miramar or the further reduction in the number of
carrier air wings from the current twelve are not considered. Both would make
available some additional aircraft, maintenance space, and lower the student
training load.
Finally, non-monetary issues and concerns relevant to the consolidation will
be presented for consideration. Though both manpower and fiscal impact are
easy to use as a measurement tool, the overall impact and repercussions to naval
aviation and the E-2/C-2 communities must be considered.
A. FINANCIAL ASPECTS
All financial analysis is done on the break even basis to determine the
payback period of the scenario. By doing this, the impact of non-recurring and
recurring expenses can be paired with expected savings. Initial evaluations will be
conducted without consideration of inflation in order to view the scenario in more
simpler terms. If the scenario results in a feasible outcome, the effects of inflation
will be added in order to achieve a more realistic appraisal of the scenario.
1. All Inclusive
The first scenario will include all savings and expenses presented in
Chapter III with the exception of milcon project P-128. Project P-128 is currently
under construction and would most likely be completed or cost more to stop than
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to finish. Cat ll/lll students are optimistically given BOQ rooms. Expenses and
savings for this scenario are presented in Table VIII.







FRAMP ISMT trainer repair 3,000,000
FRAMP trainers moving expense 2,000,000
FRAMP set-up expense 972,000
Transfer of 20 FRAMP instructors (@ $6K ea.) 120,000
Transfer of 42 officers (@ $6K ea.) 252,000
Transfer of 100 enlisted (@ $6k ea.) 600.000
Total non-recurring expenses $89,834,000
Savings: none
Net non-recurring expenses ($89,834,000 - 0) $89,834,000
Recurring:
Expenses:
Full CSI contract support $1 ,445,000
8 FRAMP transfers (@$6K ea.) 48,000
390 FRAMP students per diem & travel exp. 1,436,000
28 staff officer transfers (@ $6K ea.) 168,000
68 Cat I student transfers (@ $3K ea.) 340,000
34 Cat ll/lll per diem & travel (@ $45/day) 185,000
100 staff enlisted transfers (@ $6K ea.) 600,000
Additional VHA 830.000








Net recurring expenses ($5,052,000 - 4,400,000) $652,000
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In this scenario additional simulators are procured and VAW-120
personnel, both officer and enlisted, are transferred to VAW-1 10. Table VIII shows
both a large up front outlay and a recurring annual expense. One-time up front
funding of $89,834 million is expected. Furthermore, an additional $652,000 in
expenses to the Navy can be expected annually, before considering inflation. In
purely fiscal terms, this scenario is very unsound and should be rejected.
2. Selective Inclusion
In order to make the consolidation fiscally acceptable, some expense
elements of Table VIII must be reduced or eliminated. The following section
discusses these options and their possible impact. The objective will be to
examine the option of decreasing the non-recurring and recurring expenses, thus
generating a positive cash flow and gaining a shorter payback period.
a. West Coast Exclusive
Savings could be induced both long and short term if all the
personnel of VAW-120 are redistributed to Norfolk area commands. The additional
billets at VAW-1 10, both officer and enlisted, would be either gleaned from San
Diego commands or squeezed from the fleet squadrons. The financial impact of
this scenario is shown in Table IX. (Note milcon project P-128 is deleted since it









FRAMP ISMT trainer repair










Net non-recurring expenses ($88,862,000 - 0) $88,862,000
Recurring:
Expenses:
Full CSI contract support $1 ,445,000
390 FRAMP students per diem & travel exp. 1,436,000
68 Cat I student transfers (@ $3K ea.) 340,000
34 Cat 1
1
/1 1 1 per diem & travel (@ $45/day) 185,000
Additional VHA 830.000




Total recurring savings $4,400,000
Net recurring savings ($4,400,000 - 4,236,000) $164,000
Break even point ($88,862,000/164,000) = 541.8 years
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In this scenario only West coast personnel would be assigned to
VAW-110 to occupy the additional billets created by the E-2C/C-2A FRS
consolidation. This would be done without concern for the quality of the instructor,
only that the expense of relocating VAW-120 personnel is avoided.
The fiscal data shown in Table IX indicates that the first year non-
recurring expense would be $88,862 million in outlays. With an expected recurring
savings of $164,000 a year, without inflation, it would take 541.8 years to break-
even. The excessive payback period and the dead-end detailing created by
excluding East coast experience causes this scenario to be unacceptable.
b. Simulator Shortage
Significant non-recurring expenses could be avoided if additional
simulators are not procured. This would have a severe impact on VAW-110's
ability to train replacement E-2C and C-2A aircrew. In effect the anticipated time
allotted in Table V Chapter III would have to be halved in order to be within the
capacity of one 15F8 and 2F110 with a 14 hour training day. In addition, without
the additional simulators, related milcon and CSI expenses are reduced
accordingly. Because VAW-120's FRAMP equipment has no utility if left in Norfolk,
this scenario will continue to provide for it's transfer to VAW-110.
VAW-120 personnel transfer to VAW-1 10 is retained to improve the
quality of instruction in light of the loss of simulator facilities. Table X shows the
expected financial effects of this scenario.
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Milcon (less $1.1 million for simulator bldg.) $14,590,000
FRAMP ISMT trainer repair 3,000,000
FRAMP trainers moving expense 2,000,000
FRAMP set-up expense 972,000
Transfer of 20 FRAMP instructors (@ $6K ea.) 120,000
Transfer of 42 officers (@ $6K ea.) 252,000
Transfer of 100 enlisted (@ $6k ea.) 600.000
Total non-recurring expenses $21,534,000
Savings: none
Net non-recurring expenses ($21,534,000 - 0) $21,534,000
Recurring:
Expenses:
Full CSI contract support $745,000
8 FRAMP transfers (@$6K ea.) 48,000
390 FRAMP students per diem & travel exp. 1 ,436,000
28 staff officer transfers (@ $6K ea.) 168,000
68 Cat I student transfers (@ $3K ea.) 340,000
34 Cat ll/lll per diem & travel (@ $45/day) 185,000
100 staff enlisted transfers (@ $6K ea.) 600,000
Additional VHA 830.000




Total recurring savings 4,400,000
Net recurring savings ($4,400,000 - 4,352,000) $48,000
Break-even point ($21,534,000/ 48,000) - 448.6 years
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In this scenario it appears that the recurring expenses and savings
are off setting, resulting in the non-recurring expense never being recovered. In
light of the fact that significant impact on training would occur if forced to use only
one 15F8 and 2F110 simulator to conduct all training, this scenario is easily
rejected for being both fiscally and operationally infeasible. Simulator downtime
caused either by malfunction or system modification would be deeply felt. In
addition, it has already been presented that the E-2 and its dissimilar hardware
configurations require different trainer suites, else some aircrew will be instructed
on equipment not relevant to the aircraft they are being assigned too. The
decision to save money on simulators ($67.2 million) is insignificant compared to
the cost of one Group II E-2C (approximately $90 million). The risk of loosing an
aircraft would be too high and cost more than the simulators.
c. The Worst Case
The final scenario will combine the previous two cases. No
personnel will be transferred from the East coast and no additional simulators will
be obtained for VAW-1 10 training. This scenario represents the effect of a forced
merger to reduce naval aviation manpower at a minimal financial cost, regardless
of the effect on the eduction of E-2C and C-2A aircrew. Table XI presents the
possible financial implications of just such a scenario.
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Table XI. EXPENSES AND SAVINGS WITH









FRAMP ISMT trainer repair












Net non-recurring expenses ($12,852,000 - 0) $12,852,000
Recurring :
Expenses:
Full CSI contract support $745,000
390 FRAMP students per diem & travel exp. 1,436,000
68 Cat I student transfers (@ $3K ea.) 340,000
34 Cat ll/lll per diem & travel (@ $45/day) 185,000
Additional VHA 830.000








Net recurring savings ($4,400,000 - 3,536,000) $864,000
Break-even point ($12,852,000/ 864,000) = 14.9 years
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By far this scenario is the most draconian to be considered. It
ignores the mission and responsibility of the fleet replacement squadron. Category
I students would be sent to fleet squadrons with only textbook training and very
little hands-on experience. In effect junior officers would arrive at their squadrons
with only an apprentice's knowledge of what he needs to know in order to
effectively fly or use the weapon system. The burden to complete their training
would fall on the squadrons in order to make the aircrewman a productive, safe,
and competent member of the squadron.
3. Inflation and Discount Rate Influences
A more sophisticated analysis of the scenario would consider the effects
of inflation and the time value of money. Inflation would affect the scenario by
increasing the amount of annual savings each year by an assumed inflation factor.
Each previous years savings would be increased by the inflation factor. The end
result would be to further decrease the break-even point because more savings
would be projected for each year into the future.
The time value of money, also known as a discount rate, recognizes that
money today is worth more than money next year. The time value of money
influences the outcome of financial analysis by decreasing the amount of savings
each year by a predetermined factor, thereby representing that future savings is
worth less than immediate savings. The result of the discount rate is that the
break-even period would increase because the value of savings projected for each
year into the future would be lower than the previous year.
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Any further analysis recognizing the influence of inflation and the time
value of money would be very sensitive to the choice of the forecasted inflation
and discount rates. For this reason it is easier to forecast that the two factors will
cancel each other out, and not allow the conclusion to be manipulated by the
influence of either factor.
B. FUTURE FACTORS TO CONSIDER
Given that the U.S. Armed Forces are currently undergoing a reductions in
force structure as a result of the lessening of East-West tensions, under what
conditions would the consolidation possibly be practical?
The previous scenarios indicated that the largest outlay was for additional
simulators. In addition, the simulators were also the bottleneck to student
throughput. The demands on the trainer were greater than what a single trainer
could provide annually.
1. Changing Constraints and Demand
This scenario will concentrate on maximizing the availability of single site
simulators, and estimate under what student throughput single site training might
be potentially viable.
a. Simulator Availability
One of the initial assumptions was that the simulator would operate
five days a week, and even running 24 hours a day it could not fulfill the training
demands put on it if it had to support single site operations. This usage constraint
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will be modified to having the simulators available seven days a week, and allowing
six hours a day for maintenance, modification, and testing; thus allowing them to
be available for eighteen hours a day for training. This would make available the
2F1 10, CPT, and 15F8 each have a theoretical availability of 6,570 hours (365 days
X 18 hours) per year.
b. Student Throughput
Since the Navy is reducing it's forces by one carrier airwing in fiscal
year 1991, and is scheduled to disband another in fiscal year 1992; at what point
would student throughput be within the theoretical capacity of the single simulator
availability?
Using Table V as an annual standard, two factors can be
determined. First, the number of pilots and NFOs, by category, sent to each
squadron per year. Second, the number of hours required for each student per
simulator. This analysis will consider only E-2 aircrew. C-2 aircrew will be held
constant since they would not be directly affected by the reductions in the number
of carrier airwings.
The first item to be calculated is the number of hours on each
simulator required per student category. This is found by taking the total hours
per year in Table V and dividing it by the number of students in each category.
Table XII shows these values.
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E-2C Cat 1 Pilot 61.7 23.4 1.9
E-2C Cat II Pilot 46 18 2
E-2C Cat 1 NFO 2 58.9
E-2C Cat II NFO 2 96.5
Again, using the total number of students in Table V and dividing
by 12 fleet squadrons, an average number of students, by category, sent to fleet
squadrons can be estimated. Multiplying the number of students by Table XII
hours/simulator for each student category, we get the annual simulator time to
train the average number of replacement aircrew for a single squadron per year
(Table XIII).
Table XIII AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPLACEMENT AIRCREW PER
SQUADRON, AND THEIR AVERAGE SIMULATOR HOURS.
Annual #
students/ Number of hours annually
squadron 2F110 CPT 15F8
E-2C Cat I Pilot 3.8 234 89 7
E-2C Cat II Pilot 1 46 18 2
E-2C Cat I NFO 5.4 11 318
E-2C Cat II NFO 1.3
_3 _0 125
Totals/squadron 294 107 452
Using the total annual simulator time to train one squadrons
replacements, the number of squadrons that would need to be disestablished in
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order to be within the capacity of a single series of trainers can be determined.
First, by subtracting the flight hours not used to train E-2C aircrew from the 6,570
hours that each simulator is possibly available, gives the simulator time available
for training E-2C aircrew. Using the figures from Table V, that leaves 3,080 hours
for the pilots 2F110 simulator (6570 - 3490), and 4,330 hours for the NFOs 15F8
simulator (6570 - 3490). Table V also shows that the pilots CPT trainer is used
only to train student pilots, so the full 6,570 hours remain available for training.
Table XIV shows the total trainer time for each simulator for a different number of
airwings.
Table XIV. TOTAL SIMULATOR HOURS TO TRAIN REPLACEMENT E-2C
AIRECREW FOR A GIVEN NUMBER OF AIRWINGS.
Number of Airwings
Trainer hrs/airwinq 12 11 10 9
2F110 (294 hrs) 3528 3234 2490* 2640
CPT (107 hrs) 1284 1177 1070 963
15F8 (452 hrs) 5424 4972 4520 4068*
Note: (*) Below pilot maximum of 3,080 hours, NFO maximum of 4,330 hours.
The conclusion indicated by Table XIV is that if the Navy reduces
the number of active airwings from 12 to ten, then single site pilot training may be
possible. If the number of airwings decreases by three to nine active airwings then
both NFO and pilot training may be possible at a single training site. It should be
noted that both staff and equipment would be heavily tasked in order to provide
the maximum amount of simulator time available.
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There are several other points to consider if airwings are reduced
in the later part of the 1990's. First, the disestablishment of an East coast airwing
removes one E-2C squadron from Norfolk. A West coast airwing, in contrast,
removes one E-2 and two F-14 squadrons from Miramar, thus freeing up more
hangar space and facilities. Second, depending on how many E-2C squadrons
remain on the East coast, it may not be practical to maintain a separate simulator
for their use. These simulators would become available for use on the West coast
at the expense of relocation and milcon for facilities. This total should be far less
than the cost of new simulators. Unresolved is how to train the remaining East
coast fleet squadrons.
In summary, a reduction in the number of airwings would eliminate
one E-2C squadron per airwing. These reductions would therefore reduce the
annual training throughput of the FRS. If the simulators (15F8, 2F1 10) are tasked
at a very high usage rate, and if the number of airwings approach nine, then the
single siting issue should be re-evaluated to see if it had become cost effective.
C. NON-FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS
Manpower reductions and financial requirements are more easily quantified
and evaluated on paper than abstract issues and concerns. The evaluation of the
proposed consolidation would be remiss if it was limited to only manpower and
financial considerations. The following are community and career issues that do
not lend themselves to be easily placed on a spreadsheet or tallied.
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1. East Coast Training Issues
a. Funding constraints placed on detailers precludes West coast training of
personnel transferring between East coast commands.
b. Restricted temporary additional duty (TAD) funds impairs fleets' ability to send
enlisted personnel from fleet squadrons to utilize West coast training facilities.
c. School house limitations greatly reduces the number of quotas available.
Student throughput limitations in E-2/C-2 combined courses further prevent
personnel from receiving needed training.
d. Fleet is forced to train personnel via on-the-job-training (OJT) and with the
maintenance training improvement program (MTIP). Both have very limited
capability to provide significant improvement in technical knowledge of
enlisted maintenance personnel.
2. Effects on West Coast Operations
a. Single site FRS would double aircraft carrier tasking for pilot carrier
qualification evolutions on the West coast, and would require extensive TAD
funding in an effort to utilize East coast aircraft carrier assets.
b. Currently each FRS spends approximately 24 weeks conducting FCLPs and
20 weeks in dedicated air intercept control (AIC) training each year. These
evolutions are mutually exclusive and would preclude a single FRS from
conducting both 48 weeks of FCLP and 40 weeks of AIC training per year.
The allocation of more aircraft and instructors fails to address the saturation
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of the airspace in the Southern California area. This is contra to the goal of
reducing naval aviation manpower requirements,
c. Construction of facilities and installation of simulator equipment is expected
to take at a minimum four years. Training at VAW-110 would be degraded
until the new simulators are brought on line.
3. Effect on East Coast Operations
a. VAW-120 gears its tactics training towards operations in the Mediterranean
and the North Sea, while VAW-110 trains towards Western Pacific/Sea of
Japan operations. Single site training would have to tailor needs for specific
replacement aircrew with a corresponding increase in time to train due to
increased simulator and classroom requirements.
b. Proximity of fleet squadrons to FRS provides a rapid and open line of
communications which ensures training needs and improvements are rapidly
and precisely addressed. Single site isolates East Coast squadrons from this
source of aircrew and enlisted technicians.
c. VAW-120 provides parts support for fleet squadrons and allows for rapid
transfer of aircraft to squadrons on short notice. VAW-120 routinely serves
as the source of highly trained personnel for support of fleet E-2's that have
diverted back to Norfolk from shipboard operations. VAW-120 also
temporarily supplements manning of fleet squadrons experiencing manning
shortages in critical positions.
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d. VAW-1 20 provides support to East coast commands in numerous scenarios.
Surveillance and data links for both ship and aircraft missile exercises; data
link training for fighter and attack FRSs are but a few examples.
e. VAW-1 20 serves as the resident store house of current tactics and E-2
operations with both Second and Sixth Fleets, not to mention combat
operations off Libya and during Desert Storm.
f. VAW-1 20 has participated in counter narcotic operations from both the East
coast and the Gulf of Mexico. These operations could easily be incorporated
into flight syllabus training for student naval flight officers.
g. Local FRS provides the forum for aviators and flight officers within the Atlantic
fleet to discuss relative issues regarding updated tactics and scenarios.
h. VAW-1 20 provides the fleet squadrons a ready access to intelligence data.
4. Effect on Careers
a. East coast personnel interested in a FRS tour must determine if they can
afford housing for their tour at Miramar. Enlisted personnel who would
otherwise be retained in a closed loop detailing (going from E-2 squadron to
E-2 squadron) would be lost. These skilled and experienced technicians
would be lost to other aviation communities on the East coast. Officers
normally do not have the option of flying other aircraft. Thus personnel
wishing to fly E-2s for their shore tour must suffer the financial hardship of
single tour (normally 2.5 years) in San Diego, while running the risk of being
unable to return to the East coast.
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b. The VAW community has very few avenues to major command, the
decommissioning of VAW-120 would further acerbate the situation.
c. A tour of duty at an FRS is viewed as career enhancing. Therefore officer
retention and being competitive for future senior promotion would be limited
for those who chose to serve on the East coast.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the analysis in Chapter IV the following conclusions to the thesis
research questions are provided.
1. What impact would consolidation of the two coast E-2C and C-2A FRS
training pipeline into a single squadron have on replacement aircrew
training and fleet squadron operations?
In order to fulfill the mission of an FRS, and generate the same quality of
student output, the training capacity of VAW-1 10 would have to be increased. The
training of aircrew uses classroom lectures, flight/mission simulators, and actual
hands-on flying to develop the skills required to perform their mission in the fleet.
Limitations placed on training due to the lack of classrooms, simulators, or aircraft
will either degrade the quality of the final product, or extend the time required to
graduate a student using the prescribed syllabus. In either case consolidation
from a dual coast FRS into a single site FRS without the expansion of training
facilities, will in all likelihood result in a poorer quality of aviator and maintenance
personnel. Expanding the training facilities of the single site to accommodate the
larger student load, however, will make the consolidation fiscally undesirable.
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2. What expenses would be incurred if the status quo student throughput
and flight simulator utilization were maintained?
A smooth transition from a dual to a single sited FRS squadron to train E-2C
and C-2A aircrew, as well as enlisted technicians, will require both time and money
to implement. The initial OP-02 goal was for implementation during fiscal year
1992. Construction alone for the simulators and classrooms will take a minimum
of four years to legislate and actually construct.
Up-front an expense of just under $90 million would be required to expand
the facilities at VAW-110 and to transfer a cadre of VAW-120 personnel. At a
minimum, an additional expense of $652,000 would be required to function as a
single site FRS. Besides the increase in the number of aircraft at VAW-1 10, related
facilities improvements in hanger, ramp, power, and air were detailed. The cost
of support items such as AIMD and supply were noted but no cost estimate was
available.
3. What alternatives are viable in view of limited funding dollars and
manpower reductions?
The expense and savings of the FRS consolidation proposal were classified
as either recurring or non-recurring. Alternatives were evaluated by reducing the
non-recurring expense and increasing the recurring savings in order for the
alternative to break even during the life of the project. The E-2C is expected to
serve at least until the year 2010.
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The first scenario was built around the premise of maintaining the status quo
of the training provided at the FRS. Facilities and training at VAW-110 were
expanded to ensure identical training equal to the current training is maintained.
The next two scenarios were used to examine the effects of trying to reduce
life cycle costs of the consolidation. The most significant outlay is the $67.2 million
for additional aircrew simulators. Both a recurring and non-recurring expense is
incurred in transferring East coast personnel to West coast staff billets. Both
scenarios were evaluated independently. Both reduced non-recurring expenses
and resulted in a net recurring savings, but both would take over 400 years to
break even. This is excessive even before considering the effects of inflation.
The final scenario considered was the most severe. It represented a decision
that no additional simulators would be added, and no East coast personnel would
ever be transferred to the West coast for instructor duty.
In order to determine under what conditions a consolidation of the two FRSs
should be recommended, two critical constrainst were adjusted. First was seven
day a week simulator usage. The second was a reduction in student throughput
caused by a reduction in the number of active duty carrier airwings.
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4. What costs are associated with each alternative in implementing the
FRS consolidation?
Table XV below summarizes the totals for non-recurring and recurring
savings and expenses associated with each scenario mentioned above. In
addition, the non-inflation break even period is estimated.




No East coast staff ($88,900,000)
No additional simulators ($21,500,000)
No East coast staff &







The first scenario produced a situation where the non-recurring costs would
never be recovered, because of an additional recurring expense. The next two
scenarios produced excessive payback periods, rendering them fiscally impractical.
The final scenario resulted in a feasible solution, but at a very high cost in the




Faced with either the large up-front and additional recurring expense or a
significant drop in the capabilities of graduates of the FRS, the proposed
consolidation of the dual coast E-2C and C-2A fleet replacement training
squadrons is strongly recommended not to be accepted.
The consolidation of the East coast FRS into a single site FRS on the West
coast is physically possible but at a significant trade off. Either large amounts of
funds are required ($90 million) up front to expand VAW-1 10, and additional funds
annually ($652,000) will be needed in order for the squadron to meet the required
student throughput as well as graduate the same quality students provided by the
current dual FRS system.
The lead time to bring VAW-1 10 up to the projected student load is driven by
an expected four year construction period to expand classroom and simulator
facilities. The proposed consolidation is determined to be unaffordable.
Alternatives to not purchasing additional simulators or to not transfer East
coast personnel to West coast staff billets had very little impact on the life cycle
costs of the consolidation. Loss of the additional simulators would have effected
the training of the students. Loss of East coast instructors would have effected the
E-2C and C-2A aviation community by removing the best shore duty billets
available to junior officers.
The final scenario, no additional simulators or East cost staff, would in effect
force VAW-1 10 to double its student load while being constrained to its present
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level of training facilities. It is impractical to expect that this could be done without
significant reduction in the quality or quantity of graduates.
If the number of active duty carrier airwings is reduced to approximately nine,
the training throughput may be low enough to allow one set of simulators to
handle the student demand, all be it at a very high usage rate. Therefore it is
recommended that a review of the FRS consolidation proposal be conducted if the
number of carrier airwings is reduced to nine or fewer.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The following alternatives to the proposed FRS consolidation are submitted
for evaluation as an alternative to the dual site consolidation.
1. A cut in overall manning at both VAW-1 10 and VAW-120 equal to half of the
overall manning reduction anticipated as a result of the proposed consolidation.
2. Analyze the overall effect if the total naval aviation reduction were applied to
all naval aviation communities on a proportional basis of the communities
percentage of total naval aviation manpower.
3. Determine the life cycle cost of relocating the entire E-2C and C-2A
communities, FRSs and fleet squadrons, to a single site.
4. Determine the effect of having each FRS specialize in training for one
configuration of the E-2C. For example; the East coast trains only APS-138/139
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